IIBMS EMBA CASE STUDY SOLUTIONS – The year 2004 did not begin well for Ryanair. On 28 January, the airline issued its first profits warning and ended a run of 26 quarters of rising profits
IIBMS EMBA CASE STUDY SOLUTIONS – The year 2004 did not begin well for Ryanair. On 28 January, the airline issued its first profits warning and ended a run of 26 quarters of rising profits
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Case 4 Ryanair: the low fares airlines
The year 2004 did not begin well for Ryanair. On 28 January, the airline issued its first profits warning and ended a run of 26 quarters of rising profits. On that day, when the markets opened, the company was worth €5 billion. By close of business, its value had shrunk to worth €3.6 billion, as its share price plunged from worth €6.75 to €4.86. Investors were dismayed by the airline’s admission that it was facing ‘an enormous and sudden reduction of 25 to 30 per cent in yields’ (i.e. average fare levels) in the first quarter of 2004 (the last fiscal quarter of 2004). This was on top of an earlier fall of 10 to 15 per cent in the first nine months.
In April 2004, Chief Executive Michael O’Leary forecast a ‘bloodbath’, an ‘awful’ 2004/2005 winter for European airlines, amid continuing fare wars, with a shakeout among the many budget airlines. ‘We will be helping to make it awful,’ warned Mr O’Leary, as he announced an 800,000 free seats giveaway. The most difficult markets were predicted to be Germany and the UK regions where many new carriers, which were ‘losing money on an heroic scale’, had entered the arena. O’Leary anticipated that the company’s 2004 profits would decline by 10 per cent, while 2005 profits would increase by up to 20 per cent with a 5 per cent drop in yields. However, if yields were to fall by as much as 20 per cent, the 2005 outcome would be break-even, at best.
Yet, by 31 May 2005, on Ryanair’s 20th birthday, the carrier was able to announce record results for the year ended 31 March 2005. Both passenger volumes and net profits grew year on year by 19 per cent to 27.6 million from 23.1 million and €268.9 from €226.6 million respectively. The all- important passenger yield figure (revenue per passenger) grew by 2 per cent, partially offsetting the 14 per cent yield decline in 2003/2004. Ancillary revenues were 40 per cent higher, rising faster than passenger volumes, which resulted in total revenues rising by 24 per cent to €1.337 billion. Operating costs rose 25 per cent, fractionally more than revenue growth, due principally to higher fuel costs. The 2005 results announcement was followed by a 3.4 per cent jump in the company’s share price, to close to €6.46 on the day.
Ryanair’s adjusted after-tax margin for the full year at 20 per cent compared very to figures for Aer Lingus, British Airways, easyJet, Lufthansa, Southwest and Virgin, with margins of 8, 1, 3, minus 5, 7, .1 per cent respectively (2003/2004 results). Despite the dire warnings and the temporary dip in fiscal 2004, Ryanair had arguably come through its crisis with flying colours. How did it manage this?
The year 2004 did not begin well for Ryanair
Overview of Ryanair
Ryanair, Europe’s first budget airline, with 229 routes across 20 countries at of May 2005, is one of the world’s most profitable, fastest-growing carriers. Founded in 1985 by the Ryan family as an alternative to the then state monopoly carrier Aer Lingus, Ryanair started out as a full-service airline. After accumulating severe financial losses, finally, in 1990/91, the company came up with a survival plan, spearhead by Michael O’Leary and the Ryans, to transform itself into a low-fares no-frills carrier, based on the model pioneered by Southwest Airlines, the Texas-based operator. Ryanair, first floated on the Dublin Stock Exchange in 1997, is quoted on the Dublin and London Stock exchanges and on NASDAQ, where it was admitted to the NASDAQ-100 in 2002. In June 2005, Ryanair’s market capitalization stood €5 billion, the second highest carrier in the world, next to Southwest Airlines, and ahead of airlines with vastly greater turnover—such as Lufthansa with capitalization at €4.7 billion, British Airways at €4.3 billion and Air France/KLM at €3.5 billion. Its market capitalization was nearly four times that of easyJet, its UK-based budget airline rival. This was despite easyJet’s higher turnover, similar passenger volumes and a slightly larger fleet.
Ryanair’s fares strategy
Ryanair’s core strategy entails offering the lowest fares, and the airline claims that it generally makes its lowest fares widely available by allocating a majority of seat inventory to its two lowest fare categories. In fact, was Ryanair, originally styled as the ‘low-fares airline’, actually becoming a ‘no-fares airline’? Half of Ryanair’s passenger will be flying for free by 2009, pledged Michael O’Leary in an interview with a German newspaper. He said that ticket prices would fall by an average 5 per cent a year over the next five years, as passenger numbers grew by five million annually. One analyst speculated that Ryanair pronouncement on free seats ‘is designed to put the wind up potential competitors in the hotly contested German market. Of course, a balance must be struck between low fares to attract customers and a sufficient yield to ensure viability.
An integral part of the low fares strategy is revenue enhancement through ancillary activities, increasingly used to subsidize airfares in order to improve Ryanair margins to compensate for falls in fare yields. These include on-board sales, charter flights, travel reservations and insurance, car rentals, in-flight television advertising, and advertising outside its air-craft, whereby a corporate sponsor pays to paint an aircraft, whereby a corporate sponsor pays to paint an aircraft with its logo. Advertising on Ryanair’s popular website also provides ancillary income.
The year 2004 did not begin well for Ryanair
Despite the abolition of duty-free sales on intra-EU travel in 1999, Ryanair’s revenue from duty-paid sales and ancillary services has continued to rise. In 2005, ancillary revenues comprised 18.3 per cent of total operating revenue, up from 16.1 per cent the year before, and the ambition is to grow at twice the rate of increase in its passenger traffic. The company has outlined plans to continue raising ancillary revenues through further penetration of existing products and the introduction of new ones, especially on-board entertainment and gaming products/services. Ryanair is also considering entering the highly competitive mobile phone market and has been in talks with various UK operators with a view to forming a joint venture
Its low fares policy notwithstanding, Ryanair was able to realize a 2 per cent growth in yields in fiscal 2005. This is attributable to a number of favourable factors in the competitive landscape. Underlying passenger growth volumes returned in the industry as a whole, reducing the intensity of competition. Mainstream European operators like British Airways, Lufthansa and Air France/KLM were increasingly abandoning the short-haul sector, preferring to concentrate their growth on more lucrative long-run haul routes. Moreover, these airlines reacted to the massive price rise in the cost of aviation fuel by introducing a fuel surcharge on their fares. For example, the surcharge levied by British Airways equated to 22 per cent of an average Ryanair fare.
Another favourable factor was the failure of the threat of new entrants to materialize. Michael O’Leary’s prophecy of a 2004/2005 winter bloodbath in the European airline industry had been based on the forecast of many new entrants into the budget airlines sector, thus intensifying overcapacity. While new rivals continued to enter the fray, at any one time large numbers were also dying off. Autumn 2004 saw the demise of a number of budget airlines—for example, Volare, an Italian low-fare and charter operator, and V-Bird, a Dutch-owned carrier. Yet, new entrants were still launching. However, it was agreed that the industry could not sustain the some 47low-fares airlines operating as of the end of November 2004, Michael O’Leary predicted that the anticipated shake-out would be accelerated by rising oil prices. ‘Many of our competitor airlines who were losing money heroically when fuel was US$25 a barrel are doomed the longer it stays at US$50. We anticipate there will be further airline casualties as the perfect storm of declining fares and record high oil prices force loss-making carriers out of the industry.
The year 2004 did not begin well for Ryanair
Low fares require cost savings
To quote Michael O’Leary, ‘Any fool can sell low air fares and lose money. The difficult bit is to sell the lowest air fares and make profits. If you don’t make profits, you can’t lower your air fares or reward your people invest in new aircraft or take on the really big airlines like BA and Lufthansa.’
According to the company, its no-frills service allows it to prioritize features important to its clientele, such as frequent departures, advance reservations, baggage handling and consistent on-time services. Simultaneously, it eliminates non-essential extras that interfere with the reliable, low-cost delivery of its basic flights. The eliminated extras include advance seat assignments, in-flight meals, multi-class seating, access to a frequent-flyer programme, complimentary drinks and amenities. In 1997, Ryanair dropped its cargo services, at an estimated annual cost of IR£400,000 in revenue. Without the need to load and upload cargo, the turnaround time of an aircraft was reduced from 30 to 25 minutes, according to the company. It claims that business travellers, attracted by frequency and punctuality, comprise 40 per cent of its passengers, despite often less conveniently located airports and the absence of pampering In conjunction with the elimination of non-essential extras, the organization of its operations enables the airline to minimize costs, based on five main sources.
The year 2004 did not begin well for Ryanair
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Fleet commonality (Boeing 737s, like Southwest Airlines): this results in lower maintenance and staff training costs. In 2005, the company negotiated a new Boeing deal that takes down its per-seat costs for all post-January 2005 deliveries to rock-bottom levels. This deal not only establishes a platform for growth; a younger fleet also enables further cost reductions through lower fuel utilization and maintenance costs.
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Contracting out of aircraft cleaning, ticketing, baggage handling and other services, other than at Dublin Airport; this is more economical and flexible, while it entails less aggravation in terms of employee relations.
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Airport charges and point-to-point route policy: Ryanair uses secondary airports that are less congested, motivated to offer better deals and have fewer delays, resulting in increased punctuality and shorter turnaround times.
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Staff costs and productivity: productivity-based pay schemes and non-unionized staff.
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Marketing costs; Ryanair was the first airline to reduce and finally eliminate travel agents’ fees. In January 2000, Ryanair launched its www.ryanair.com website. This has had the effect of saving money on staff costs, agents’ commissions and computer reservation charges, while significantly contributing to growth. In 2005, Internet sales accounted for 97 per cent of all bookings. Ryanair supplements its advertising with the use of free publicity to highlight its position as the low fares champion, by attacking various constituencies that threaten its cost structure. These include EU regulators, airport authorities, politicians and trade unions. Its per passenger marketing costs of 60c are considered to be the lowest across the European airline sector
The year 2005 saw enormous volatility in the price of oil, and the global airline industry faced losses of US$6 billion. Ryanair, which had been unhedged with respect to oil prices since September 2004, announced on 1 June that it was hedging 75 per cent of its fuel needs for the October 2005 to March 2006 period, at a price of US$47 a barrel. At times, in previous weeks, the price had stood at US$53-plus per barrel. At the end of June, the price had hit US$60 and analysts were predicting it would rise to US$70-plus in the coming months.
Low costs contribute to a low break-even load factor of 62 per cent, so the airline can make money even if it fills fewer seats than other budget competitors with higher costs and higher break-even load factors. For example, easyJet’s break-even load factor is 73 per cent, while that of Virgin Express is 83 per cent. Table 6 shows Ryanair’s operating cost structure.
The year 2004 did not begin well for Ryanair
Table 6 Ryanair consolidated profit and loss accounts
Operating revenuesScheduled revenuesAncillary revenues |
Year ended 31 March 2005€000 |
Year ended 31 March 2004€000 |
||
1,128,116 |
924,566 |
|||
208,470 |
149,658 |
|||
Total operating revenues—continuing operations |
1,336,586 |
1,074,224 |
||
Operating expenses |
||||
Staff costs |
140,997 |
123,624 |
||
Depreciation and amortization |
98,703 |
98,130 |
||
Other operating expenses |
||||
Fuel and oil |
265,276 |
174,991 |
||
Maintenance, materials and repairs |
37,934 |
43,420 |
||
Marketing and distribution costs |
19,622 |
16,141 |
||
Aircraft rentals |
33,471 |
11,541 |
||
Route charges |
135,672 |
110,271 |
||
Airport and handling charges |
178,384 |
147,221 |
||
other |
97,038 |
78,034 |
||
Total operating expenses |
1,007,097 |
803,373 |
||
Operating profit before exceptional costs and goodwill |
|
329,489 |
270,851 |
|
Profit for the year |
|
266,741 |
206,611 |
The year 2004 did not begin well for Ryanair
Customer service
The airline’s claims of attention to customer service are encompassed in its Passenger Charter, which embraces a number of doctrines:
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Sell the lowest fares at all times on all routes and match competitors’ special offers.
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Allow flight and name changes with requisite fee
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Strive to deliver on-time performance
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Provide information to passengers regarding commercial and operational conditions
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Provide complaint response within seven days
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Provide prompt refunds
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Eliminate overbooking and involuntary denial of boarding
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Publish monthly service statistics
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eliminate lost or delayed luggage
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Ryanair will not provide refreshments or meals or accommodation to passengers facing delays; any passenger who wish to avail themselves of such services will be asked to pay for them directly to the service provider
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Ryanair facilitates wheelchair passengers travelling in their own wheelchair; where passengers require a wheelchair, Ryanair directs those passengers to a third-party wheelchair supplier at the passenger’s own expense; Ryanair is lobbying the handful of airports that do not provide a free wheelchair service to do so.
The company has confirmed that it would introduce a number of cost-cutting new features on its flights. For instance, the Ryanair fleet would heretofore be devoid of reclining seats, window blinds, headrests, seat pockets and other ‘non-essentials’. Leather seats instead of cloth ones would allow faster turnaround times since leather is quicker and easier to clean. More controversially, Michael O’Leary hoped eventually to wean passengers off checked-in luggage, eliminating the need for baggage handling, suitcase holding areas and lost property. In 2004, Ryanair had one of the lowest baggage allowances of any major airline, at 15 kg a person, and charged up to €7 for every additional kilo, one of the highest surcharges in European aviation.
The year 2004 did not begin well for Ryanair
Successive Annual Reports cite-on-time performance (defined as up to 15 minutes after scheduled time in UK Civil Aviation Authority statistics) and baggage handling as of key importance to customers. On punctuality, Ryanair claims to be the most punctual airline between Dublin and London. On baggage handling, Ryanair claims less than one bag lost per 1000 carried, better than even the best US airline, Alaska Airlines, with 3.48 bags per 1000 lost, and considerably better than its role model Southwest Airlines with 5.00 per 1000 lost.
Tables 7and 8, and Figure 3 provide some independent comparisons of Ryanair with other airlines on punctuality and customer perceptions.
Reporting airport/airline |
Origin/ destination |
% early to No. of 15minutes |
Average delay flights |
||
flights |
late |
(minutes) |
unmatched |
||
Birmingham—Ryanair |
Dublin |
180 |
88 |
6 |
0 |
Birmingham—Aer Lingus |
Dublin |
299 |
89 |
7 |
2 |
Birmingham—MyTravel |
Dublin |
4 |
50 |
20 |
0 |
Heathrow—Aer Lingus |
Dublin |
785 |
71 |
16 |
2 |
Heathrow—bmi British Midland |
Dublin |
432 |
71 |
14 |
0 |
Stansted—Ryanair |
Dublin |
727 |
79 |
11 |
1 |
Gatwick—British Airways |
Dublin |
180 |
82 |
9 |
0 |
Gatwick—Ryanair |
Dublin |
298 |
87 |
8 |
2 |
Heathrow— bmi British Midland |
Brussels |
354 |
73 |
13 |
1 |
Heathrow— British Airways |
Brussels |
452 |
84 |
9 |
2 |
Heathrow— bmi British Midland |
Palermo |
8 |
25 |
37 |
0 |
Heathrow—Alitalia |
Milan(Linate) |
174 |
63 |
15 |
0 |
Heathrow— British Airways |
Milan(Linate) |
178 |
80 |
10 |
0 |
Heathrow— bmi British Midland |
Milan(Linate) |
172 |
68 |
13 |
0 |
Heathrow—Alitalia |
Milan (Malpensa) |
298 |
48 |
24 |
0 |
Heathrow— British Airways |
Milan (Malpensa) |
180 |
80 |
10 |
0 |
Stansted— Ryanair |
Bergamo |
172 |
76 |
10 |
0 |
Stansted— easyJet |
Bologna |
60 |
70 |
14 |
0 |
Stansted— easyJet |
Milan(Linate) |
60 |
42 |
39 |
0 |
Stansted— easyJet |
Rome (Ciampio) |
120 |
76 |
12 |
0 |
Stansted— Ryanair |
Rome (Ciampio) |
356 |
79 |
9 |
0 |
Stansted— easyJet |
Edinburgh |
327 |
60 |
20 |
0 |
Stansted— easyJet |
Nice |
120 |
70 |
24 |
0 |
Stansted— Virgin Express |
Nice |
1 |
0 |
184 |
0 |
Stansted— Ryanair |
Montpellier |
59 |
76 |
14 |
2 |
Stansted— Ryanair |
Prestwick |
562 |
87 |
6 |
4 |
Stansted— easyJet |
Glasgow |
276 |
87 |
8 |
0 |
Glasgow—Aer Lingus |
Dublin |
176 |
80 |
9 |
4 |
Glasgow—bmi British Midland |
Dublin |
2 |
100 |
0 |
0 |
On punctuality, it must be borne in mind that one is not necessarily comparing like with like when contrasting figures for congested Heathrow with Stansted or Luton, even if all serve London. Also not counted in the statistics were cancelled flights. Ryanair has been known to ‘consolidate’ passengers by transferring them from their original flight to later or alternative routing without any notice, if passengers were unfortunate enough to have originally been booked on a low seat occupancy flight. Ryanair has announced that it would ignore European Commission proposals stipulating that passengers whose flight has been cancelled and who have to wait for an alternative flight should be provided with care while waiting, stating ‘we do not, and never will offer refreshments’.
The year 2004 did not begin well for Ryanair
Clouds on the horizon
Despite its winning performance in its 2005 results, a number of issues faced Ryanair
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While the competitive threat of new budget carriers had not emerged, some of the mainstream carriers were becoming quasi-budget airlines on short-haul routes. An important instance of this was Aer Lingus, the national state-owned airline of Ireland, operating domestic and international services, with a fleet of 30 aircraft. The events of 11 September 2001 were particularly traumatic for Aer Lingus, as the airline teetered on the verge of bankruptcy. In late 2001, the choice was to change, or to be taken over or liquidated. Led by a determined and focused chief executive and senior management team, the company set about cutting costs. By the end of 2002, Aer Lingus had turned a 2001 €125 million loss into a €33 million profit, and it improved still further in 2003 with a net profit of €69.2 million. In essence. Aer Lingus claimed that it had transformed itself into a low-fares airline, and that it matched Ryanair fares on most routes, or that it was only very slightly higher. The airline’s chief operating officer said that “Aer Lingus no longer offers a gold-plated service to customers, but offers a more practical and appropriate service…it clearly differentiates itself from no-frills carriers. We fly to main airports and not 50 miles away. We assign seats for passengers, we beat low fares competitors on punctuality, even though we fly to more congested airports, and we always fulfil our commitment to customers—unlike no frills carrier. While Aer Lingus had been an early adopter, other mainstream airlines like British Airways and Air France/KLM were also converting short-haul intra-European routes to the value model offered by Aer Lingus.
The year 2004 did not begin well for Ryanair
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Further source of pressure came from the EU. A decision from the EU Commission in February 2004 ruled that had been receiving illegal state subsidies for its base airport at publicly owned Charleroi Airport (styled ‘Brussels South’ by Ryanair). Of course, it was not only the Charleroi decision but also the precedent it could set that was of concern. Other deals with public airports would come under scrutiny, although the vast majority of the airline’s slots were at private airports. Also, it was estimated that Ryanair would have to repay €2.5 million and €7 million to Charleroi’s regional government. Ryanair appealed the decision, but also threatened to initiate state aid cases and complaints against every other airline flying into any state airports offering concessions and discounts. Airport fees comprised 19 per cent of Ryanair’s operating costs and were deemed to be an inherent part of the airline’s low-cost model. Thus, Ryanair warned that there was no mid-cost alternative model. Nevertheless, two months after the Charleroi verdict, Ryanair confirmed that it had agreed a new deal there. It would keep flying all its 11 routes from Charleroi, continuing existing airports and handling charges until the airport, which accommodated 1.8 million passengers a year at the time, reached two million passengers a year. The EU Commission was not readily convinced and initiated an investigation of the new settlement.
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On another regulatory matter, the EU had devised fresh rules to cover overbooking that results in boarding denials to passengers by air-lines. Air travellers bumped off overbooked flights by EU airlines would receive automatic compensation of between €250 and €600. Compensation might also be claimed when flights are cancelled for reasons that are the carrier’s responsibility, provided the passengers have not been given two weeks’ notice or offered alternative flights. Ryanair declared that the new rules would not impact its operations, as it did not overlook its flights, and had the fewest number of cancellations and the best punctuality record in Europe. It suggested that, it the EU is serious, it should just outlaw the practice of over-booking entirely.
The year 2004 did not begin well for Ryanair
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A few days prior to the EU decision on Charleroi, on 30 January 2004, at the Central London County Court, a disabled man won a landmark case against Ryanair after it charged him £18 (€25) for a wheelchair he needed at Stansted to get from the check-in desk to the aircraft. The passenger was awarded £1336 (€2400) in compensation from Ryanair, as the UK-based Disability Commission said it may launch a class action against the airline on behalf of 35 other passengers. Ryanair’s immediate reaction was to levy 70c a flight on all customers using the affected airports. In December 2004, the decision against Ryanair was upheld on appeal, although it was somewhat mitigated when the Court of Appeal decided that Stansted Airport was also answerable and had to pay half of Ryanair’s liability for damages, with interest. In response, Ryanair’s lawyer suggested that the 50:50 split in liability was unclear and unexplained, and ‘could well have been delivered by King Solomon’.
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Also in 2004, a disgruntled Ryanair passenger set up a website inviting complaints about the airline. Ryanair moved to have the website shut down in early 2005, on the grounds that it contained material that is ‘untrue, unfounded, malicious and deeply damaging to the good name and trading reputation of Ryanair’, and that the name and appearance of the site, which resembled that of Ryanair’s home website could be construed as ‘abusive registration’. However, the site has reappeared under an ISP provider in Canada, and its number of hits has increased since the incident was reported in the British satirical magazine Private Eye.
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On another front, Ryanair was in dispute against the British Airports Authority (BAA), as it filed a writ at the High Court in London for alleged ‘monopoly abuse’ at Stansted. Michael O’Leary warned that the action was only the first skirmish in what would become ‘the mother and father of a war’. The Chief Executive of the BAA announced that he did not intend to negotiate further reductions to Ryanair’s deeply discounted deal on landing charges at Stansted, due to finish in March 2007. The average charge per passenger would rise form £3 to £5 at the airport, whose capacity utilization was now so high that it was running out of slots at peak times. Meanwhile, Michael O’Leary was scathing about ‘grandiose plans’ to build a second runway at Stansted at cost of £4 billion, ‘when the cost of a runway and even a terminal should run no more than £400 million.
The year 2004 did not begin well for Ryanair
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As if these issues were not enough, a number of Dublin-based Ryanair pilots were planning to establish their own association, the Ryanair European Pilots Association with links to the British Airline Pilots Association (BALPA), the Irish Airline Pilots Association (IALPA) and the European Cockpit Association. In November 2004, these pilots, supported by IALPA, took a complaint about victimization against Ryanair to the Irish Labour Court. Ryanair could potentially face a compensation bill of £44 million if 170 victimization claims brought by its Dublin-based pilots were to be upheld. The company had out-lined various consequences to pilots if they joined a trades union: possible redundancy when the existing 737-200 fleet was phased out, no share options or pay increases, non promotions and no payment for future recurrent training.
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The airline declared its determination to keep out trades unions and to take a case to the High Court to prove that legislation attempting to force companies to negotiate with unions was unconstitutional. A ruling favourable to the pilots in February 2005 by the Irish Labour Relations Commission, ordering that Ryanair had to attend a hearing dealing with the pilot’ complaints, was dismissed by Michael O’Leary: ‘It is no surprise that the brothers have found in favour of the brothers. We will fight them on the beaches, in the fields, and in the valleys,’ he said. Meanwhile, the airline is also fighting a number of legal challenges, including proceedings against IALPA, accusing it of conducting an organized campaign of harassment and intimidation of Ryanair pilots through a website, warning them off flying the airline’s new aircraft. Indeed, the carrier claims that specific threats issued on the website are being investigated by the Irish police. In April 2005, Ryanair abandoned an experiment in paid-for in flight entertainment, after passengers were reluctant to rent the consoles at the £5 required to receive the service. Apparently, market research discovered passengers are unwilling to invest on such short flights, with the ideal being six-hour flights to longer-haul holiday destinations. When the experiment was launched in November 2004, Michael O’Leary hailed the move as ‘the next revolution of the low-fares industry…we expect to make enormous sums of money’.
The year 2004 did not begin well for Ryanair
Questions:
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How does Ryanair’s pricing strategy account for its successful performance to date? Would you suggest any changes to Ryanair’ pricing approach? Why/why not?
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Is the ‘no-fares’ strategy a useful approach for Ryanair in the short term? In the long term?
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Do the issues facing Ryanair threaten its low-fares model?
The year 2004 did not begin well for Ryanair
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